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There is a long-standing debate as to whether the Fisher effect operated during the classical gold standard
period. We break new ground on this question by developing a market-based measure of general inflation
expectations during the gold standard. Since the gold-silver price ratio was widely used to track inflation
during the gold standard period, we are able to derive a measure of inflation expectations using the
interest-rate differential between Austrian silver and gold perpetuity bonds with identical terms. Our
empirical evidence suggests that inflation expectations exhibited significant persistence at the weekly,
monthly, and annual frequencies. We also find that market participants updated long-run inflation
expectations following short-run changes in the forward silver price of gold. The evidence suggests
the operation of a long-run Fisher effect during the classical gold standard period.
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Searching for Irving Fisher 
 
 
  Several studies have found that ex post inflation rates are uncorrelated with the 
level of nominal interest rates during the classical gold standard period even though the 
Fisher equation is an empirical relationship based on inflation expectations.
1 One possible 
explanation for the failure of the Fisher equation in this earlier period is that inflation 
expectations were nearly zero given the low level of persistence in annual measures of ex 
post inflation rates (Barsky, 1987; Bordo and Kydland, 1995; Fisher, 1930; Friedman and 
Schwartz, 1982).
2  Other possible explanations for the lack of correlation between 
nominal interest rates and inflation rates include the hypotheses that financial markets 
had money illusion or that investors did not understand the quantity theory of money 
(Summers, 1983; Cagan, 1984; Choudry, 1996; Barsky and Delong, 1991).   
Several scholars have attempted to estimate price and inflation expectations 
during the gold standard period to test for the presence of a Fisher effect using time series 
econometric models (Capie, Mills, and Wood, 1991; Perez and Siegler, 2003). An 
obvious limitation to this approach is that we do not have a very good idea of the 
economic model that market participants used to form inflation expectations (Barsky and 
DeLong, 1988). Other studies have looked at the relationship between actual inflation and 
nominal interest rates to test for the presence of a Fisher effect. Summarizing the 
literature, McCallum (1984) points out that studies of pre-World War I changes in the 
                                                 
1 Many studies have found that nominal interest rates during the gold standard are correlated with the price 
level rather than the rate of inflation. Barsky and Summers (1988) argue that that this positive correlation is 
a direct result of the fact that the price level in the inverse of the price of gold. Benjamin and Kochin (1984) 
argue that Gibson’s Paradox during this period is a spurious relationship. 
2 For a discussion of inflation expectations during the gold standard period, see Barsky and DeLong (1983). 
For an analysis of the persistence of inflation during the gold standard period and later, see Burdekin and 
Siklos (1996). Harley (1977) analyzes prices and interest rates in the UK during the gold standard period to 
test Gibson’s Paradox.   2
price level have simply shown that past inflation cannot forecast future inflation and 
therefore say very little about inflation expectations or the failure of the Fisher effect 
during the gold standard period.
3 
To break new ground on this issue, we collect high-frequency asset price data that 
allow us to compute a market-based measure of inflation expectations for the 19
th 
century. In particular, we use data on Austrian gold, silver, and paper government bonds 
to compute measures of inflation expectations at high and low frequencies during the 
classical gold standard period and test for the presence of a long-run Fisher effect. 
Austria was the only major European country during the classical gold standard period 
that issued gold, paper, and silver perpetuity bonds that actively traded on the leading 
financial exchanges of Europe including London, Paris, Berlin, Amsterdam and Vienna 
for most of the gold standard period, 1880-1913.  
We use the interest-rate differential between Austrian silver and gold bonds to 
derive an ex ante market-based measure of inflation expectations. Our use of the silver-
gold interest-rate differential is motivated by the observation that the gold-silver price 
ratio was a widely followed price. The Economist, for example, regularly reported on 
activity in the silver market in their weekly summary of financial markets. Moreover, we 
find evidence of a long-run cointegrating relationship between Austrian silver and paper 
bonds. This suggests that silver bonds are a good proxy for overall inflation expectations 
in Austria.  
Our empirical analysis suggests that inflation expectations were not a white noise 
process during the gold standard period. We find economically meaningful persistence in 
inflation expectations at the weekly, monthly, and annual frequencies. We then test for 
                                                 
3 For an analysis of the Fisher effect during the post-WWII period, see Mishkin (1981, 1992).   3
the presence of a Fisher effect by comparing our measure of inflation expectations 
computed from Austrian bonds with a short-run measure of inflation expectations 
calculated from the spot and futures market for the silver price of sterling (gold). We 
show that short-run changes in inflation expectations Granger-cause long-run inflation 
expectations. We interpret our findings as evidence of the operation of a Fisher effect 
during the classical gold standard period.  
The next section of the paper discusses our data on Austrian bonds during the 
classical gold standard period. In section III, we analyze the time series properties of 
inflation expectations during our sample period in Austria and then test for a long-run 
Fisher effect. The last section discusses our findings and their implications. 
 
II. Austria and the Gold Standard 
  
To derive a market-based measure of inflation expectations and to test for the 
presence of a Fisher effect during the gold standard period, we assembled a new database 
of weekly prices of Austrian gold, silver, and paper sovereign debt issues over the period 
1880-1911 using bond quotations from the Economist.
4 Austria tapped international 
capital markets on a significant scale following the passage of the Law of March 16, 
1876, which authorized a 16 million florin bond issue that was exempt from Austrian 
taxes and paid interest half-year in gold in Vienna and other European exchanges 
including Amsterdam, Berlin, Brussels, Frankfurt, and Paris. Morys (2008) estimated that 
foreigners held approximately 80 percent of the debt issue. In 1910, the Stock Exchange 
                                                 
4 The Economist and The Times stopped quoting prices for Austrian paper bonds in 1911.   4
Official Intelligence reported that there were more than 490 million Austrian Kroner gold 
bonds unredeemed that traded on markets throughout Europe.    
Austria also issued silver bonds on the leading European exchanges. Issued in 
1868, the bonds were perpetuity obligations and subject to a 16 percent income tax. The 
coupon payments on the fiver percent silver bonds were payable half-yearly on February 
or August 1
st or on May 1
st and November 1
st (Stock Exchange Official Intelligence, 
various issues). There was approximately 519 million Kroner of outstanding silver bonds 
in 1910.  
Finally, Austria issued floated large amounts of government debt throughout 
Europe in its own currency. Initially issued in the late 1860s, the paper bonds were 
perpetuity obligations and subject to a 16 percent income tax. The coupon payments on 
the paper bonds were payable half-yearly on February or August 1
st or on May 1
st and 
November 1
st ( Stock Exchange Official Intelligence, various issues). Like the silver 
bonds, the paper debt did not contain a sinking-fund and had a five percent coupon. The 
market value of unredeemed paper bonds exceeded more than 886 million Kroner in 
1910. Morys (2008) finds that approximately 20 percent of the paper bonds were held by 
foreign investors. Only the UK, France, Germany, Netherlands, and the United States 
were also able to sell large bond issues in their home currency on several European 
markets during the classical gold standard period.  
Some scholars have characterized nineteenth-century Austria as a financially 
underdeveloped, agriculturally-oriented economy, suggesting that it belonged to the 
periphery rather than to the core of European gold standard countries like the United 
Kingdom, France, or Germany. However, the fact that Austria was able to issue paper   5
debt successfully throughout Europe suggests that it may have more closely resembled a 
core gold standard country. In contrast to countries on the periphery, Austria suffered 
“original sin” only to the extent that its debt was denominated in gold, silver, and paper 
florin (Eichengreen and Hausmann, 1999; Bordo, Meissner, and Redish, 2005). A 
depreciation in the paper florin, for example, would require Austrian authorities to collect 
more tax revenues (in paper florin) to service its debt denominated in gold florin.
5 
In addition, Austria’s standard of living prior to World War I compares favorably 
to other core gold standard countries, such as France and Germany (see Figure 1). 
Further, Austria was one of the leading European military powers of the late nineteenth 
century and its financial markets appear to have been well developed and integrated 
(Good, 1977). An integrated network of joint stock banks with an extensive branching 
system (including the important Viennese banks) emerged in the 19
th century to lend to 
businesses throughout the Austrian empire. Further, Austria borrowed from the German 
model of universal banking in forming institutions such as the Creditanstalt fur Handel 
und Gewerbe (1855), and it created a central bank in 1816, modeled after the Bank of 
France, which had the exclusive right to issue notes. 
The issuance of sovereign debt denominated in gold, silver, and paper is also 
partly a function of its monetary history. Austria was on the silver standard for much of 
the nineteenth century, but like many other countries, went onto the gold towards the end 
of the century. The Compromise of 1867 between Austria and Hungary gave 
constitutional foundations for a monetary union with the silver florin as the monetary 
standard and a central bank with no authority to print new currency issues. Despite this 
                                                 
5 This was true even after Austria joined the gold standard. As shown in the Amsterdamsch Effectenblad, 
after Austria joined the gold standard, the coupons for paper bonds often traded at a discount to the coupons 
for gold bonds.   6
agreement, Austria and Hungary disagreed over the management of monetary policy. In 
addition to a monetary union, Hungary wanted overdraft facilities and a central bank 
office in Budapest. In July 1878, Austria and Hungary renewed the “Compromise of 
1867” for ten years, but changed the name of the central bank from the Austrian National 
Bank to the Austro-Hungarian Bank. This new agreement created central bank offices in 
Budapest and Vienna with both German and Hungarian as the official languages of the 
monetary institution. 
But after 1879, the florin was no longer convertible into silver. The exchange-rate 
system then began to resemble a float more than a peg. Silver florin traded for as much as 
seven percent from the mint par ratio and, as shown in Figure 2, exchange rates exhibited 
significant fluctuations in the 1880s. Austria then joined the gold standard in August 
1892 after renewing the “Compromise” with Hungary for a second time. At this point, it 
also established the kronen (crown) as its new currency. The kronen’s value was fixed in 
terms of gold and complete control of the money supply was given to the central bank. 
The credibility of this new monetary regime was further buttressed in 1899 when 
Hungary was granted full parity with Austria in the management of the central bank. 
Investors reacted favorably to this new power-sharing arrangement:  large capital inflows 
from the leading European financial centers including London, Paris, and Berlin occurred 
in response (Tullio and Wolters, 2007).  
Flandreau and Komlos (2001) argue that even though Austria never formally 
established gold convertibility prior to World War I, the country was a de facto member 
of the gold standard by 1896 because of the stability of its exchange rate. For example, 
Tullio and Wolters (2007) show that the Austrian exchange rate vis-à-vis other major   7
gold standard countries (England, France, and Germany) fluctuated within a range of 
about 15 percent between 1876 and 1891 and just eight percent between 1892 and 1895. 
The share of metallic-backed notes to paper notes issued by the central bank increased 
from an average of 53 percent over the period 1876-1895 to an average of nearly 75 
percent over the period 1896-1914 (Tullio and Wolters, 2007). After 1896, the exchange 
rate for the Austrian crown relative to other gold standard countries fluctuated only two 
percent and +/- 0.4 percent from mint par (Flandreau and Komlos, 2001; Tullio and 
Wolters, 2007). Figure 2 confirms that Austrian exchange rates were remarkably stable 
after the country joined the gold standard. Based on the behavior of the exchange rate, 
Flandreau and Komlos (2001) conclude that Austria was a country that was neither a core 
nor a peripheral member of the gold standard, but rather somewhere in between.   
   
III. Empirical Analysis of the Fisher Effect 
 
A. Model and Estimating Inflation Expectations 
The Fisher equation states that the nominal interest rates on a given sovereign 
debt obligation is equal to the real interest rate plus the expected rate of inflation. The 
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Equation (3) states that the silver-gold interest rate spread is equal to the expected rate of 
inflation in the silver-gold price ratio.  
To carry out our empirical analysis, we make three assumptions about the bonds 
and investor behavior: (1) investors are risk-neutral; (2) the real interest rate is the same 
for both bonds given that the Austrian government issued the two debt obligations; and 
(3) silver and gold bonds have identical default risk. The third assumption of identical 
default risk appears reasonable since Austria faithfully repaid its sovereign debt between 
1880 and 1913. Given that the silver and gold bonds were widely held by foreign 
investors, Austria could not differentially default on the silver bonds without damaging 
its reputation in international capital markets. Even if there were some differential default 
risk between silver and gold bonds, the premium is not likely large enough to have a 
qualitative impact on our analysis.  
Figure 3 plots current yields on a weekly basis for the Austrian gold, silver, and 
paper bonds from January 1880 to April 1911. The three series tend to move together, 
with the gold bond having the lowest interest rate over the course of the sample period. 
As shown in Table 1, the average interest rate for Austrian gold bonds during the gold 
standard period is about 430 basis points with a standard deviation of 39 basis points. The 
interest rate on silver debt averaged approximately 555 basis points with a standard 
deviation of 61 basis points. The average interest rate for paper bonds over the entire 
sample period was 559 basis points with a standard deviation of 63 basis points. Bond   9
yields were highest during the silver standard for these three debt issues. Following the 
adoption of the gold standard, the average yield for the gold bonds fell by approximately 
60 basis points and more than 100 basis points for the silver bonds.  
Figure 3 shows that the interest rates on silver and paper bonds are nearly 
identical and the two series may contain a common stochastic trend. . We employ the 
Engle-Granger two-step procedure to test for cointegration between paper and silver 
bonds.  The  MAX λ  statistic of 134.44 suggests that the null hypothesis of no cointegration 
can be rejected at conventional levels of significance.
6 We find even stronger results 
when Austria was a de jure member of the gold standard (1892-1911) or for the period 
from 1896 to 1911 – when Austria was de facto on the gold standard and the Austrian 
exchange rate exhibited very small fluctuations away from mint par. Using either of the 
de jure or de facto start date for Austria’s adoption of the gold standard, we are unable to 
reject the null hypothesis that the paper and silver bonds share the same stochastic trend. 
This finding suggests that the silver-gold interest rate differential is not only a measure of 
inflation expectations in the relative price of silver and price, but it is also a measure of 
overall inflation expectations in the Austrian economy.  
The silver-gold price ratio was widely quoted in the financial press as an 
important indicator of inflation during the entire gold standard period. Consider the 
following an excerpt from a manufacturer to the Editor of the Economist: 
The great event of the last few weeks has been the rise in silver [price of gold]. It 
is the supposed cause of a considerable rise in the prices of many commodities, 
and if the predictions of bi-metallists are worth anything, it ought to have greatly 
improved the position of the cotton spinner and manufacturer. (Economist, May 
24, 1890, p. 665) 
 
                                                 
6 We are also able to reject the null of no cointegration using the Johansen cointegration test.   10
Prof. J.S. Nicholson, quoted in the Economist, noted “that the fall in the gold price of 
silver has coincided almost exactly with the fall of the gold prices of commodities in 
general” (Economist, February 10, 1894, p.171). Since consumer price indexes or 
wholesale price indexes were not yet widely available to investors and market 
participants, they relied on information from the silver price of gold to form expectations 
about the broader movements in prices.  
Figure 4 plots our weekly measure of inflation expectations, 
G S e
t
− , π , alongside 
weekly current yields for Austrian paper-bonds for the period January 1880 to April 
1911. The simple correlation coefficient between paper interest rates and inflation 
expectations is approximately 40 percent. Inflation expectations over the entire sample 
period averaged 1.25 percent (125) basis points and accounted for approximately 22 
percent of the nominal interest rate (inflation expectations/nominal interest rate). Since 
inflation expectations were relatively stable (the standard deviation is less than three 
percent), the empirical evidence also indicates, as suggested by Shiller and Siegel (1977), 
that movements in real interest rates were probably more important than inflation 
expectations in driving fluctuations in Austrian nominal interest rates.  
 
B. Persistence of Inflation Expectations 
 
To examine the time-series properties of long-run inflation expectations during 
the classical gold standard period, we first test for a unit root using the Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller-GLS test. The null hypothesis of a unit root can be rejected at the one-  11
percent level of significance.
7 To measure the persistence of inflation expectations, we 
estimated ARIMA models for the entire sample period as well as the periods when 
Austria was a member of the silver and gold standards. As shown in Table 2, inflation 
expectations in Austria are best characterized by an AR(3) process over the entire sample 
period. The sum of the autoregressive coefficients is over 97 percent, which indicates a 
high degree of persistence in inflation expectations. The constant indicates that investors 
expected inflation expectations of approximately 1.23 percent per year. For the silver 
standard period, we also find a high degree of persistence. Inflation expectations are best 
characterized by an AR(2) process. The sum of the autoregressive coefficients during the 
silver standard period is over 97 percent. The coefficient on the constant term in the 
equation suggests that financial market participants expected inflation to average 
approximately 1.51 percent per year.  
For the gold standard period, we estimate ARIMA models from August 1892 to 
April 1911, and find that the best model for inflation expectations is an AR(2) model. 
Table 2 shows that the level of inflation persistence drops to about 94 percent. Although 
we observe a slightly lower level of persistence in inflation expectations after Austria 
joined the gold standard, there is a marked reduction in the average level of inflation 
expectations from 1.51 percent to 1.06 percent. These findings suggest that there was 
significant persistence in inflation expectations and that joining gold reduced the average 
level of inflation expectations by roughly 30 percent.    
  One possible critique our analysis thus far is that the large persistence in inflation 
expectations may be driven by the use of high frequency data in the estimation process. 
                                                 
7 We experimented with lag lengths of 1 to 12 for the unit root tests. In all cases, we were able to reject the 
null hypothesis of a unit root at the five percent level of significance.    12
We therefore re-estimated the baseline empirical results using end-of-month data. The 
ARIMA models of monthly inflation expectations are presented in Table 3. The results 
are similar to those employing the weekly data. Inflation expectations followed an AR(1) 
process when the country adhered to the silver standard and inflation persistence is 
greater than 90 percent and significant at the one-percent level. For the gold standard 
period, inflation expectations are best modeled as an AR(1) process. Although inflation 
expectations are once again not a white noise process, the coefficient on the 
autoregressive term falls by roughly 12 percent, from 95 to 83 percent.  
Using annual data, we find similar results for the persistence of inflation. The 
constant term shown in Table 4 indicates that annual inflation expectations averaged 
more than one percent over the full sample period. Again, we find that there is significant 
persistence in inflation expectations: the sum of the two autoregressive terms is nearly 90 
percent. Hence, using weekly, monthly, or annual data, we find substantial persistence in 
inflation expectations during the gold standard period as measured by the silver-gold 
interest rate differential.  
  Another possible critique of our analysis is that Austria’s commitment to gold 
might have been perceived as less credible than other western European countries, and 
hence the analysis of inflation expectations we derive for it may not be very 
representative of gold club members. That is, inflation expectations for non-credible 
members of the gold standard may be much larger than for countries that strictly adhered 
to the monetary rule. While Austria was a newer member of the gold standard in 
comparison to France, Germany, and the UK, it does not appear that market participants 
viewed its commitment to gold as substantially less credible than these countries.   13
Mitchener and Weidenmier (2008) provide evidence that Austria was one of the most 
credible gold standard monetary regimes during the period 1870-1913: market 
participants expected the Austrian kroner to depreciate approximately three percent after 
the country joined the gold standard based on the premium of paper over gold bonds. The 
level of expected depreciation is considerably smaller than several other gold standard 
countries including the United States, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, India, Mexico, and 
Russia. We therefore interpret our results as providing a lower bound on the size and 
persistence of inflation expectations for the average core country during the classical gold 
standard period.  
 
C. Testing for a Long-Run Fisher Effect 
 
  We now provide a straightforward test of the long-run Fisher effect’s operation 
during the classical gold standard era. We analyze the relationship between the 60-day 
forward and spot silver price of gold and our measure of inflation expectations based on 
interest rate spreads. The forward market for silver began operation in the early 1890s, so 
we collected weekly a new data set on silver prices from contemporaneous newspapers. 
The  Manchester Guardian began regularly reporting data on 60-day forward silver 
contracts in March 1894 while the Economist began reporting on the silver market in 
January 1896. We use the spot and forward silver price of gold (as expressed in pound 
sterling) to compute an annual measure of short-run inflation expectations for the period 
March 17, 1894 to April 28, 1911.    14
Our measure of short-run inflation expectations (assuming that inventory costs are 
constant over time) can be written as: 
 












, π are inflation expectations, 
F
t s  is the 60-day forward silver price, and  t s is the 
spot silver price of sterling (gold). The right hand side of equation (4) is multiplied by 
60,000 (=6*100*100) to convert inflation expectations into an annual measure expressed 
in basis points. The short-run measure of inflation expectations computed from the silver 
spot and forward markets averaged -170 basis points with a standard deviation of 487 
basis points over the entire sample period. Figure 5 shows our short and long-run 
measures of inflation expectations. The short-run measure of inflation expectations is 
significantly more volatile than the long-run measure of inflation expectations. 
  We estimate Granger causality tests to examine the relationship between our 
short-run and long-run measures of inflation expectations. We first test the short-run 
measure of inflation expectations using the Augmented Dickey-Fuller-GLS test. The null 
hypothesis of a unit root can be rejected at the five-percent level of significance.  We then 
estimate Granger causality tests for the entire sample period for which we have data on 
the silver forward market. A lag length of 18 weeks is chosen for the empirical analysis 
based on the Akaike Information Criteria (AIC).
8 The empirical results are presented in 
Table 5. Our short-run measure of inflation expectations Granger causes the interest-rate 
differential between silver and gold bonds at the one-percent level of significance. This 
suggests that market participants updated long-run inflation expectations based on 
                                                 
8 We considered lag lengths up to 26 weeks (half a year) for the empirical analysis.   15
changes in short-run inflation expectations. The result is consistent with recent research, 
which has found that long-term US government bonds respond to short-run 
macroeconomic and financial surprises (Gürkaynak et. al, 2005). On other hand, we do 
not find evidence that our long-run measure of inflation expectations Granger causes 
changes in short-run inflation expectations. This is not very surprising given that long-run 
inflation expectations largely reflect information over a longer time horizon than 60 days.  
We follow-up the Granger-causality tests with an impulse response analysis, and 
give the forward/spot silver market the second ordering in the Choleski decomposition. 
By placing silver second in the ordering, we provide a lower-bound estimate of the 
impact of a one-standard deviation shock of short-run inflation expectations on long-run 
inflation expectations (measured by interest rate differential).  Figure 6 shows that a one-
standard deviation shock to short-run inflation expectations increases long-run inflation 
expectations by 30 basis points over two years (cumulative impulse response). As the 
graph indicates, the impulse response is statistically different from zero (at the 95 percent 
confidence level) from about the 25 to 70 week horizon. The result implies that a 
depreciation in silver (i.e. an increase in short-run silver inflation expectations) increases 
the Austrian silver-gold interest rate differential. 
As a robustness check, we also estimate the relationship between long and short-
run inflation expectations over the de facto gold standard period – 1896 to April 1911. As 
Table 6 shows, we also find that short-run inflation expectations Granger-cause long-run 
inflation expectations over this sample period, but not vice-versa. Impulse response 
functions for the period 1896-April 1911 are shown in Figure 7. As the figure indicates, a   16
shock to short-run silver inflation expectations increases long-run inflation expectations 





Macroeconomists and economic historians have long searched for the operation of 
Irving Fisher’s eponymous effect during the classical gold standard period. We show that 
Fisher and his effect may be lurking in the inflation expectations of Austrian sovereign 
debt issues of the 19
th century. We compute one of the first, high-frequency market-based 
measures of general inflation expectations for the classical gold standard period so that 
we can test for the presence of the Fisher effect. Previous studies have used gold bonds 
and econometric models to examine the relationship between nominal interest rates and 
inflation. We believe that our measure, the interest rate differential between silver and 
gold bonds, provides a more direct approach for studying the behavior of long-run 
inflation expectations during the gold standard period. Our measure is motivated by the 
fact that the gold-silver price ratio was widely followed by contemporary market 
participants and the fact that our measure of inflation expectations does not rely on 
modern econometric tools and software to calculate.  
Our analysis of inflation expectations, proxied by the interest rate differential 
between silver and gold bonds, suggests several conclusions. First, the adoption of the 
gold standard reduced the average level of inflation expectations in Austria. Joining the 
gold standard led to a 30 percent drop in inflation expectations, from 1.5 percent to 1.1 
percent, as measured by decisions made in financial markets. We also find that there is   17
considerable persistence in long-run inflation expectations at the weekly, monthly, and 
annual frequencies. The empirical analysis suggests the presence of a Fisher effect given 
that changes in inflation expectations computed from the forward market for silver 
Granger cause movements in the Austrian interest-rate differential between silver and 
gold bonds. Market participants updated long-run inflation expectations following short-
run changes in the future silver price of gold. Investors during the classical gold standard 
period required an inflation premium that was built into nominal interest rates as long as 
the debt obligation was denominated in silver or paper rather than gold.   18
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Table 2. ARIMA Models of Inflation Expectations(Weekly Data) 






















Observations 1631  655  976 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
 
Table 3. ARIMA Models of Inflation Expectations 
(Monthly Data) 













AR(2)      
AR(3)      
Observations 375  149  225 
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Table 4. ARIMA Models of Inflation Expectations 
(Annual Data) 








* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
Table 5 
Long-Term Fisher Effect 
Granger Causality Tests (F-tests) 
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Long-Term Fisher Effect 
Granger Causality Tests (F-tests) 
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Figure 2


















































































































































Source: Flandreau and Zumer (2004)  
    
 
Figure 3 















































































































































































































































































    
 
Figure 4 














































































































































    
 
Figure 5

















































































































































































































































    
 
Figure 6 
Response of Long-Run Inflation Expectations to a 
One-Standard Deviation Shock to Short-Run Inflation Expecatations

























    
 
Figure 7
Response of Long-Run Inflation Expectations to a 
One-Standard Deviation Shock to Short-Run Inflation Expecatations
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